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Federal Indian Policy, Klamath Women, 
and Childbirth
CHRISTIN HANCOCK
AS SCHOLARS OF CHILDBIRTH have pointed out, “birth” is always more 
than a mere biological event.1 It is inherently a social process as well, one 
that is shaped by cultural norms and power structures that are both raced 
and classed. For Native American women, the historical experiences of birth 
have been shaped by the larger context of settler colonialism.2 Despite this 
reality, very little attention has been paid by historians of childbirth to the 
ways that Native women’s experiences are bound up in this broader ten-
sion between assimilation and resistance to dominant colonial structures. 
Similarly, few historians of American Indians have focused their attention 
specifically on birth.3 And yet birth is inherently tied to our beliefs about, as 
well as our experiences and practices of, health and health care. Always, the 
regulation and practice of birth is also about the regulation and practice of 
health. What constitutes health? Who defines “good” health? And who has 
access to it? As reproductive justice scholar Barbara Gurr has noted, social 
and political forces must be considered in any attempts at answering these 
questions for marginalized women. One cannot explore the history of Native 
women’s experiences of childbirth without also engaging in a larger history 
of the ways that their health and health care have been defined and shaped 
by federal Indian policies. Gurr argues that such an approach is “particularly 
relevant to many Native American women, whose group identity has been 
historically targeted for removal and assimilation by the U.S. federal govern-
ment.”4 As explained by scholars Lorenzo Veracini and Edward Cavanagh, 
settler colonialism seeks to eliminate indigenous peoples; rather than being 
relegated to a single past event, it is an ongoing process that continues 
indefinitely.5 Framing Native women’s lives in terms of settler colonialism is 
essential to understanding the larger context in which Native women birth. 
Similarly, highlighting the social processes and experiences of childbirth, 
which are clearly connected to health and well-being, illuminates the ways 
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settler colonialism continues to impact individual Native women’s lives, 
even as it also asks us to think more broadly about how social, political, and 
economic policies influence the way all American women birth. 
In Oregon, Klamath women’s health and experiences of pregnancy and 
childbirth have been dramatically transformed by shifting federal Indian 
policies that have structured their lives from the nineteenth-century insti-
tution of the reservation era through the mid-twentieth-century period of 
termination. Over the course of that hundred years, federal Indian policies 
that may, at first glance, appear disconnected from health and health care 
have nonetheless devastated the Klamath people’s overall “well-being,” a 
term used by American Indian Policy Review authors in the 1970s to define 
and explain “health” among Native peoples.6 As a result, the Klamath suf-
fered in two distinct but equally important ways. Federal policies, beginning 
with the reservation system but also including the later policy of termina-
tion, disrupted traditional Klamath birth practices, replacing them with the 
western medical model of care. After disrupting those traditions, the federal 
government repeatedly failed to provide both funding for and access to any 
KLAMATH WOMEN SUPPORTED one another through pregnancy and childbirth. Here, a baby 
swings in a basket at a campsite near the Klamath Agency under the watchful care of two women. 
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adequate level of western health care. These continuous failures reflect the 
ongoing nature of settler colonialism and its impact on Klamath women’s 
birthing experiences. 
HISTORY OF KLAMATH TRIBES, WOMEN, AND HEALTH
Before nineteenth-century Euro-American contact and the subsequent 
transformation of their lives into a reservation framework, women played 
important roles in Klamath culture. Pre-reservation gender roles appear to 
have afforded Klamath women considerable latitude with regard to assigned 
work. Responsible for gathering wokas (pond-lily seeds), a staple of the tradi-
tional diet, Klamath women also functioned as shamans, the most respected 
position within pre-reservation Klamath culture.7 As highly valued members 
of Klamath society, women maintained a certain degree of control over their 
lives even as they entered into marriage. Unlike many neighboring western 
tribes, the Klamath viewed marriage as a “social obligation” rather than a 
“negotiated transaction.” Bridal payments were made to maintain “social 
esteem” rather than as a reflection of the economic worth of the families 
involved. Although Klamath women were expected to marry, they were not 
obligated to remain in unhappy marriages. According to ethnographer Leslie 
Spier, “the bride is in no sense a chattel; she may leave her husband at will, 
and she certainly cannot be disposed of as a possession.”8 
Klamath women’s value was also reflected in pre-reservation pregnancy 
and childbirth customs. Cultural norms dictated that a wife could leave 
her husband if he was discovered to be impotent. In the reverse situation, 
however, Klamath customs prohibited the husband from leaving his wife; 
instead, he would be permitted to take an additional wife, but the woman’s 
inability to birth did not exclude her from family. In addition, husband and 
wife temporarily re-located to the woman’s mother’s home during her first 
pregnancy so that she could be assisted during pregnancy, childbirth, and 
the post-partum period. In this way, prenatal care was provided to women 
through advice and care passed down through the mother’s family.9 Assisted 
by female midwives during childbirth, Klamath women provided and received 
health care from one another, with traditional childbirth customs and rituals 
maintained through cultural practices. 
The imposition of the reservation system in 1864 disrupted these cus-
toms. As scholar Clifford Trafzer has noted in his study of infant mortality 
among the Yakama, the poverty brought about by the reservation system 
completely altered Native American health.10 Protected from EuroAmerican 
contact until the relatively late date of 1825, the Klamath originally comprised 
three distinct tribes: the Klamath (originally called the Ewksiknii), the Modoc, 
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and the Yahooskin band of 
Snake Indians. Condensing 
these distinct and adversarial 
tribes into one, the federal 
government assigned the 
Klamath Tribes one drasti-
cally reduced tract of res-
ervation land. The Treaty 
of 1864 gave twenty million 
acres of ancestral land to the 
federal government, while 
placing the newly merged 
tribe on a reservation total-
ing just two million acres.11 
The initial adjustment to this 
settler colonialism proved 
difficult, but over time, the 
multiple groups seemed 
to congeal, perhaps out of 
necessity; nonetheless, even 
today many Klamath Indi-
ans refer to themselves by 
their primary tribal affilia-
tion — Modoc, Yahooskin, or 
Klamath.12
As Klamath members 
adjusted to reservation cul-
ture, the pressure to assimilate mounted, upsetting traditional religious and 
healing practices as well as gender roles.13 Under the terms of the peace 
policy, the Klamath reservation came under the control of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church, which quickly converted many Klamath members. In the 
evangelizing effort, Klamath Christians were employed by the church to 
address other Klamath Indians about Christianity. Within the first twenty-five 
years, two boarding schools were constructed on the reservation, where 
Klamath children were indoctrinated into Christianity while performing heavy 
labor. White missionaries and federal Indian agents regarded the Klamath 
as fairly quickly assimilating. Agency and missionary records reported that 
the Klamath “easily” took on white names, clothing, and appearances. 
Despite these official reports, Klamath Indians actively retained important 
customs, even as they adapted white practices in their negotiation of the 
new reservation culture.14 
KLAMATH WOMEN’S responsibilities included food 
preparation. Here, a woman grinds wokas, a dietary 
staple. 
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The Methodist missionaries and federal Indian agents employed on the 
reservation (many of whom were ordained ministers) made concerted efforts 
to rid the Klamath of traditional shamanistic healing practices, a campaign 
that undoubtedly affected Klamath women’s status. Noting the connection 
between medicine and religion, federal agents regularly pressured shamans 
by threatening and even imprisoning them in an effort to clear the way for 
acceptance of both Christianity and modern medicine.15 The deliberate 
purging of shamans, combined with the strong evangelizing presence of 
the Methodist Episcopal Church, created a climate in which western health 
care became customary on the reservation. Gradually, Klamath members 
began to avail themselves of western health services on the reservation, with 
women’s roles as shamans lost to the new customs of reservation culture. 
Although their early history of colonization is similar to that of other Native 
peoples in the United States, unlike nearly every other American Indian tribe, 
BEFORE PROCESSING THEM, the women first gathered the pond lily seeds via boat. Edward 
Curtis created this photograph in 1923, during the Klamath Tribes’ reservation era. It shows that, 
despite federal efforts at full assimilation, some traditional lifeways remained.
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the Klamath Tribes of Oregon paid for all of their government-provided health 
services.16 Situated as they were on one of the world’s largest stands of pon-
derosa pine, Klamath management of their forests on a sustained-yield basis 
made it possible for the Klamath Tribes to be economically self-sufficient. In 
1870, the Klamath Tribal Agency constructed a sawmill, and the profits from 
its management made the Klamath a wealthy tribe, at least compared to most 
American Indian tribes at the turn of the twentieth century. Per capita pay-
ments based on sustained-yield logging of their timber became the primary 
means of economic survival for many Klamath Indians throughout the first 
half of the twentieth century.17 In response to a 1921 survey by the Oregon 
Tuberculosis Association, Klamath Agency Superintendent Walter G. West 
wrote: “Practically all funds expended at this Agency come from the moneys 
of the tribe held in trust by the government . . . so that in reality the Indians 
of this Reservation, their support and maintenance, and the administration of 
their affairs, cost the Government nothing.”18 Historian Patrick Haynal argues 
that in part because of their relative wealth, the Klamath both accepted and 
had better access to western health care services than did the majority of 
American tribes.19 With proceeds from their timber stands, the Klamath Tribes 
prioritized and paid for access to western health care services, funding a 
medical clinic (eventually a hospital) and medical staff on the reservation.20 
Even as reservation culture contributed to the decline in women’s sta-
tus, late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Klamath women regularly 
negotiated settler colonialism through their interactions with non-Native 
health care workers. They also became targets of a federal public-health 
agenda specifically associated with pregnancy and birth-related issues. 
In their efforts to assimilate and “civilize” the Klamath, non-Indian field 
matrons visited Klamath women in their homes, instructing “them in good 
housekeeping and sanitation.”21 In addition, as Claudia Lorenz recalled from 
her childhood on the Klamath reservation, these white field matrons helped 
birth babies and instructed new mothers on “how to care for the child, to 
avoid infections, especially of the eyes and to treat minor diseases and inju-
ries of the whole family.”22 By the 1940s, public health nurses replaced the 
untrained field matrons.23 Employed alongside the agency physician, these 
nurses, known as field nurses, often ended up doing the lion’s share of the 
health work on the reservation.24 And like the field matrons before them, field 
nurses attempted to assimilate Klamath women into the western model of 
pregnancy, childbirth, and childcare as they assisted with birth, well baby 
care, and parenting, even setting up scales at the clinic for mothers to stop 
by and weigh their babies.25
By the 1920s, broader developments in medical systems altered Klamath 
women’s health care with the creation of a hospital that resulted from an 
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Oregon Tuberculosis Association’s study of health on the Klamath reserva-
tion. Conducted by L. Grace Holmes, R.N., Director of the Bureau of Surveys 
and Clinics, the impetus for the study came from the repeated complaints of 
the Klamath County Health Officer, Dr. A.A. Soule, who alleged that tuber-
culosis was rampant and untreated on the reservation, and that it posed a 
threat to the local white community in Klamath Falls, where Klamath members 
traveled regularly to trade. In response to the allegations, Klamath Agency 
Superintendent West requested that the Oregon Tuberculosis Association 
make a study of the situation. From the beginning, Klamath women were 
a focus for this public health work. Responding to West’s request, Holmes 
wrote: “The distressing loss of little Indian children certainly makes us feel 
that we should offer Indian mothers all the help we possibly can.”26 In October 
1921, Holmes arrived at the Klamath agency and spent a month interview-
ing Klamath members in their homes and at tuberculosis clinics across the 
reservation.
Holmes’s study found a 
somewhat similar picture of 
Indian health as might be 
found on other Indian res-
ervations at the time — the 
prevalence of tuberculo-
sis, trachoma, dental prob-
lems, intestinal illnesses, 
and a high infant mortality 
rate, with women particularly 
affected by illness — and 
recommended the immedi-
ate construction of an agency 
hospital.27 Notably, the study 
also reported that Klamath 
members had repeatedly 
asked the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) for more and bet-
ter health services, including 
construction of a reservation 
hospital to be paid out of their 
own tribal funds. Clearly, the 
Klamath were open to and 
desirous of western health 
care. Repeatedly, however, 
the Klamath were denied 
NINE YEARS AFTER being forced into reservation 
living, these Modoc women — wives, sister, and daughter 
of Captain Jack — sit for a photograph in 1873.
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their requests. In fact, Holmes’s report reveals that as early as 1921, Klamath 
members struggled with the patronizing bureaucracy of the Indian Affairs 
office. The continued rejection of their requests must have proved extremely 
frustrating. Meanwhile, Holmes’s report recommended the construction 
of both a reservation hospital and a tuberculosis sanatorium in proximity 
to the Klamath reservation that would accept Indian patients — two of the 
very health requests repeatedly made by the Klamath themselves.28 Indeed, 
the roots of a move toward self-determination are evidenced in Klamath 
efforts to provide and access their desired health care. But, it was perhaps 
Holmes’s recommendation, coming as it did from a non-Native public health 
agency — the Oregon Tuberculosis Association — that finally prompted 
the construction of a hospital at the Klamath agency, where it remained in 
operation until it was forced to close during World War II. 
Klamath women in particular made use of the hospital and its services. 
Women were strongly encouraged by both field matrons and field nurses to 
deliver their babies in the hospital, and Klamath women frequently complied 
with these recommendations. Field Nurse Bessie K. Houts reported in 1944 
that she assisted with many deliveries and that Klamath women appeared 
to respond favorably to delivering their babies in the hospital, as long as 
they arrived there in time to do so.29 Not all Native American women sought 
out agency hospitals for birthing. As Emily K. Abel and Nancy Reifel argued 
in their study of Lakota Sioux interactions with field nurses, the women of 
that tribe negotiated the western medical system by selectively incorporat-
ing “what was necessary for survival,” while rejecting that which they found 
useless or offensive.30 The fact that Houts reported a favorable response 
among the Klamath to hospital birthing suggests that Klamath women actively 
valued their agency hospital as an acceptable site for childbirth. Of course, 
one could also argue that some women’s failure to arrive at the hospital 
“in time” to birth represents a counter-choice. Regardless, by the 1940s, 
hospital birth had become somewhat common among Klamath women. 
Klamath member Ramona Soto-Rank relayed her own birth at the Klamath 
agency hospital. For her, the notable element of her birth story was not the 
hospital, but the fact that her mother was an older woman — of forty-six or 
forty-seven years — when she gave birth.31
Despite the fact that the Klamath paid for their hospital services, they 
experienced the same losses in health care services as other American 
Indian tribes during World War II. For the Klamath this meant closure of their 
agency hospital, and for women this closure meant, among other things, 
finding alternatives for childbirth. The redirection of medical personnel to 
the war effort quickly depleted American Indian health services across the 
country, and despite the repeated efforts of the Klamath Tribal Council, the 
This content downloaded from 64.251.250.230 on Wed, 08 Nov 2017 22:43:13 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
174 OHQ vol. 117, no. 2
hospital never re-opened.32 Although the Klamath Executive Committee 
even explored the possibility of constructing a new hospital, termination, 
which marked the end of federal services to the Klamath, loomed on the 
horizon, thwarting any new building projects. In the interim, however, tribal 
reimbursements to area hospitals (such as the hospital in nearby Klamath 
Falls) were made available to Klamath members to help offset the hospital 
loss. It is likely that many women continued to avail themselves of this service 
as well as health services provided by the remaining reservation medical 
clinic.33 On the brink of termination, Klamath members regularly accessed 
western health care services, even working to save and enhance those 
services as they faced the cutbacks of World War II. Ultimately, however, 
termination destroyed the options, leaving Native women to figure out their 
health care on their own.
On the eve of termination, Klamath women clearly had a long history of 
interactions with western health care, but their cultural negotiations extended 
beyond that realm. Those other experiences, all of which shaped the general 
state of well-being for Klamath women, are significant for understanding the 
context of Klamath women’s lives as they entered the era of termination. 
Throughout their reservation history, Klamath women gained considerable 
experience negotiating white culture through their engagement with federal 
Indian agents, federal policies, and service work off the reservation. Contact 
with the dominant norms of white culture eventually transformed cultural 
customs such as marriage, for example. White visitors to the reservation fre-
quently noted with great concern the high rate of “broken marriages” among 
the Klamath. Failing to recognize cultural differences (after all, traditional 
Klamath customs allowed women to leave undesirable marriage situations), 
federal Indian agents prioritized the strict acceptance of white legal marriage 
as defined by state law. In 1944, the U.S. Congress approved PL 477, an act 
authorizing the mandate of Klamath Indians to marry according to Oregon 
state law. Superintendent B.J. Courtright posted a notice to the Klamath 
in 1945, threatening that “those few Indian couples on the Klamath Indian 
Reservation who are married and living together according to Indian custom 
have until June 13 to be married according to Oregon State law, otherwise 
they must separate or be dealt with accordingly.”34 Clearly the control of 
Klamath women through the sanctioned legal channels of marriage emerged 
as a priority for white federal officials, thus shaping Klamath women’s lives. 
Additionally, by the 1950s, Klamath women had a long history of providing 
service work in the homes of white people, including both Indian agents and 
local people living in small towns near the reservation.35 Contact with whites 
in this type of service role placed Klamath women in an unequal power rela-
tionship even as it contributed to the alteration of pre-reservation Klamath 
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gender roles and cultural customs. Thus, as termination approached, nearly 
one hundred years of reservation living and negotiation of the intruding 
dominant white culture had influenced Klamath culture — and particularly 
Klamath women — considerably. Indeed, for women, by the 1950s, federal 
policies and the economic context of reservation life shaped every facet of 
their lives, which ultimately affected their overall health. With termination, 
Klamath women’s lives and health would continue to be affected by fed-
eral policies. It is therefore useful to explore briefly the historical context 
of termination. 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TERMINATION
Termination policy, the ultimate governmental attempt at assimilation, gained 
speed during the early 1950s. In part as a conservative reaction to the slightly 
more liberal shifts of John Collier’s Indian New Deal of the 1930s, Congress 
became enamored with the idea of terminating federal responsibility for 
Indian Affairs, a tactic believed to be the key to solving the myriad problems 
facing American Indians, including the continued and pressing problem of 
poor health. Supporters of termination believed that the federal government’s 
guardian-ward relationship with American Indians fostered a dependency 
that was responsible for the excessively high rates of poverty and unem-
ployment as well as poor health on reservations. This narrow view in effect 
blamed American Indians for the impoverished conditions of reservations. 
Ignoring intense racism on the part of white communities toward American 
Indians, supporters of termination believed that eliminating the special status 
of American Indians would lead to successful assimilation into the dominant 
white society. The shift in federal policies that accompanied and reflected 
these goals again altered the experiences of pregnancy and childbirth for 
Native women. Termination created an unhealthy cultural environment for 
all tribal members.
With the 1950 appointment of Dillon S. Myer as Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, termination moved rapidly forward. Under Myer’s tenure, American 
Indians witnessed the quick reversal of any New Deal gains, as Bureau 
employees who held views similar to Collier’s were fired. The new adminis-
tration restricted American Indian rights and liberties; for instance, Myer and 
the Bureau curtailed health services, interfered with local Indian elections, 
attempted to establish regulations limiting American Indian access to attor-
neys, centralized decision-making power in area directors, and re-established 
old limitations on American Indian religious and personal freedoms.36 Pro-
termination legislators singled out certain American Indian tribes as “ready” 
for termination, and among these were the Klamath of Oregon.37 Senators 
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Arthur Watkins (R-Utah) and James Murray (D-Montana) became the driving 
Congressional forces behind termination, and their methods were authori-
tarian, disrespectful, and relentless.38 In July 1953, Congress passed House 
Concurrent Resolution 108, approving the new policy, and soon after the 
eighty-third congress began passing termination bills for specific tribes.39 
Tribes of Oregon were particularly hard hit; in addition to the Klamath, all of 
the tribes of western Oregon (sixty-one small tribes and bands) were slated 
for termination.40 
Elimination of Indian health services became a central piece of the ter-
mination agenda, with Myer first evidencing this commitment through his 
restrictions on health services. Myer lobbied for legislation that would give 
the Bureau authority to give away control of Indian hospitals to private parties 
without Indian consent. Although this particular piece of legislation failed, 
Myer nonetheless continued to curb health services and Indian authority over 
those health services by closing many small hospitals and health clinics and 
refusing to allow funds for the rebuilding of others.41 In 1954, the passage of 
PL 568 — which transferred the Indian Health Services from the BIA to the 
Public Health Service (PHS) within the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare — formalized Myer’s desire to eliminate the bureau’s responsibility 
for health care. With the transfer, health care became an official focus of the 
termination agenda. The move was intended to assimilate Native Americans 
into the dominant society by streamlining the provision of health care services 
through the same governmental agency responsible for health services 
to veterans and indigent Americans. This meant that all tribes, even those 
who were not directly terminated, were indirectly affected by termination 
legislation, as management of their health care services shifted from the 
BIA to the PHS. For terminated tribes, health services were completely lost. 
Although the Klamath Tribal Council strongly opposed termination, and 
Klamath members were never allowed the opportunity to vote on this federal 
policy that would so drastically change their lives, the tribe was nonetheless 
terminated. Having judged the Klamath “ready,” the eighty-third Congress 
sent the Klamath Termination Bill, PL 587, to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
who signed it into law on August 13, 1954. Perhaps even worse than their 
lack of a vote on the issue, the Klamath were coerced into accepting the 
provisions of the termination bill. Owed over two million dollars on a lands 
claim that had recently been decided in their favor, the Klamath were told 
by Watkins that without Klamath consent on the termination bill, the judg-
ment funds would not be released to them. Eventually acquiescing to the 
pressure, the Klamath General Council was then directed to have individual 
members vote on whether they would withdraw from the tribe and receive a 
lump sum of money for their ancestral land, or remain in the tribe with man-
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agement of their assets trans-
ferred from the BIA to a trust 
operated by the U.S. National 
Bank of Portland, Oregon. In 
both instances, their federal 
status as Indians would be 
stripped from them, as would 
all treaty-mandated services 
including health care. Forced 
to choose between what critic 
John Collier called “cash 
and an unknown quantity,” 
the vast majority of Klamath 
members chose the cash.42 
Recognizing that they did 
not have a voice or choice 
in termination, most Klamath 
members opted to withdraw 
from the tribe, hoping that at 
least they would come away 
from years of injustice with 
something to show for it. 
Thus, when the votes came 
in, 78 percent (more than 
1,650) of the members of the 
Klamath Tribe had decided to 
withdraw, while 474 Klamath 
Indians chose to remain in the tribe, although they no longer had a reser-
vation, tribal council, or federal services.43 On April 17, 1961, withdrawing 
members received a lump sum payment totaling $43,000 for their portion 
of tribal land, while management of the “remaining” members’ assets was 
transferred from the BIA to the U.S. National Bank.44 The Secretary of Agri-
culture officially took possession of 525,000 acres of unsold Klamath forest, 
converting those ancestral lands into the Winema National Forest. 
Termination devastated the Klamath. The tribe was torn apart during 
the process, and in the aftermath, health and welfare declined tragically. 
Accelerating the cultural losses set in motion by nineteenth-century federal 
policies, termination resulted in increased illness, alcoholism, and violence, 
in addition to the loss of land, community, and economic security. Tor the 
Klamath, it translated into an overall loss of well-being. In its preparations for 
termination, the federal government focused almost entirely on timber value 
SELDON KIRK, Chairman of the Klamath Tribal Council, 
testified against termination at the 1956 hearings, linking 
the new federal policy to the continued theft of Klamath 
lands. 
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and timber sales.45 In exploring the human costs of termination, it becomes 
clear that in addition to all of their material losses, the Klamath also lost their 
health — physically, spiritually, and psychologically. 
WOMEN AND PREPARATION FOR TERMINATION
Between the passage of the Klamath Termination Bill in 1954 and the official 
institution of termination in 1961, the Klamath Executive Committee worked 
to stop the termination process even as it prepared for tribal health needs 
in the aftermath; on both fronts, women took significant action. Opinion sur-
veys conducted at the time suggest that women maintained a commitment 
to staying within the tribe at a higher rate than did men. Although these 
surveys represented attitudes only, as opposed to actions, Klamath women 
eloquently testified against termination. In addition, Klamath Executive Com-
mittee member Dorothea McAnulty raised concerns about termination’s 
impact on health and led the committee’s preparations to meet those needs 
of tribal members. 
At the Tribes’ expense, the federal government hired management spe-
cialists to direct and manage the termination process. Those managers hired 
the Stanford Research Institute to conduct surveys that included detailed 
interviews and questionnaires with Klamath tribal members in order to assess 
their attitudes toward termination.46 The surveys revealed Klamath confu-
sion as well as opposition to government-imposed termination.47 Ultimately, 
based on these surveys, the management specialists concluded that the 
Klamath Tribes were not prepared for termination and that proceeding with 
the process would prove devastating for Klamath members. 
One of the most interesting yet neglected findings of the Stanford 
Research Institute’s survey was the gendered nature of Klamath attitudes 
toward termination. According to the final report: “A larger percentage of 
women than men express a desire to remain in the Tribe.”48 A review of 
the questionnaires used by the Stanford study suggests that even women 
who believed they would ultimately withdraw from the tribe tended toward 
a desire to see the reservation lands kept together. Several responded 
favorably to the suggestion of keeping the reservation together through 
the formation of either a cooperative or a corporation, citing the need “to 
protect the people that remain on the reservation.”49 Yet these women also 
tended to express hesitancy that such a plan could be viable, consider-
ing their lack of trust in the government and the BIA. Nonetheless, they 
displayed attitudes of concern for the Tribe as a whole and a seeming 
preference for maintaining the Tribe. At least one scholar, Donald Fixico, 
has suggested that American Indian men returning to reservations from 
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their military service in World War II tended to favor termination. Fixico 
argues that having experienced mainstream consumer culture during their 
training and service, Native men came home desiring an equal share of a 
more prosperous America.50 Other scholars have criticized Fixico, rightly 
suggesting that BIA officials and Congressional bureaucrats who ushered 
through the legislation should be blamed for termination, not American 
Indians.51 Nonetheless, Fixico’s claims could shed light on the gendered 
nature of the divided Klamath Indians. 
Potentially, Klamath experiences in World War II, combined with the 
deliberate Congressional campaign for termination based on the rhetoric of 
“liberation,” resonated with Klamath men more so than it did with Klamath 
women, causing men to be more willing to accept the possibility of with-
drawal from the tribe and women to be more resistant to the idea.52 Pro-
termination legislators and BIA officials repeatedly described termination 
to Klamath Indians as legislation that would “liberate” them, providing them 
with all of the rights of “first-class citizens.”53 In using this rhetoric, legislators 
and BIA officials constructed an argument that claimed the Klamath were 
more educated, more successful, and more “ready” for termination than other 
American Indians.54 In the context of post–World War II America, “liberation” 
was an appealing idea, even if it was based on a myth. Indeed, through 
their military experiences in World War II, Klamath men were undoubtedly 
exposed to the dominant culture’s gendered emphasis on the importance 
of independence, thus plausibly diminishing their own commitments to col-
lective identity. Remembering the predominance of the myth of liberation, 
Soto-Rank recalled: “And I think that was part of it, because the government 
had come out and sold this story about being first class citizens, quote 
unquote.”55 Klamath women seemed somewhat less likely to buy into this 
rhetoric of individuality, instead maintaining a perspective that included the 
Tribe as a whole. 
One such woman, Dorothea McAnulty — the sole female on the Klamath 
Executive Committee in 1956 — regularly struck at the heart of the injustices 
facing the Klamath, both in terms of policy and process.56 Highlighting the 
continuing cultural differences between the Klamath and the dominant 
white society, McAnulty defended the intellect and capability of Klamath 
women, as well as the legitimacy of cultural difference. Testifying at the 
federal hearings on termination, McAnulty countered the popular notion 
that Klamath problems stemmed from federal dependency. “If they want to 
know what causes the trouble on the reservation, it’s an easy thing to see” 
she told the Senate Committee Chair. “I think if they’d pen up a group of 
you people somewhere and give you nothing to work with you’d be at each 
others’ throats too.”57 McAnulty argued that challenges facing the Klamath 
This content downloaded from 64.251.250.230 on Wed, 08 Nov 2017 22:43:13 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
180 OHQ vol. 117, no. 2
Tribes resulted from a lack of freedom in determining their own futures.58 
Another Klamath woman, Mary Reys, testified: “I’d rather have the land” than 
the money. Criticizing lawmakers and BIA officials, Reys said, “I don’t think 
they know what they’re talking about. And I don’t say that to belittle them; 
I say that because I honestly do believe they don’t know what they’re talk-
ing about. They certainly don’t know the people they are talking about.”59
Even as McAnulty and other members of the Executive Committee 
campaigned against termination, they also prepared for its anticipated 
consequences, particularly with regard to health and health care. In 1956, 
McAnulty first raised concerns about the impact of termination on health. 
Noting that termination would immediately end all federal services, includ-
ing health care, McAnulty worked with fellow Executive Committee member 
DOROTHEA MCANULTY, the only woman on the Klamath Tribal Council, also testified against 
termination. Executive Committee members shown in this 1955 photograph are (right to left): 
Dibbon Cook (secretary-treasurer), Joe Miller, Jesse L. Kirk (also on tribal land board), McAnulty 
(also secretary of land board and of enrollment committee), Elnathan Davis, and W.W. Palmer 
(superintendent of Klamath reservation). 
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Boyd Jackson to create a sound medical plan to provide for the health care 
needs of Klamath members.60 McAnulty researched private health care 
providers and insurance companies in an unsuccessful effort to find one 
that would be willing to work with the Klamath to provide medical services.61 
After months of “exhaustive attempts,” the Klamath Executive Committee 
approved a resolution creating a $750,000 health fund from which any Tribal 
members’ medical debts and expenses would be paid. The Tribal Council 
hoped that the health fund, in conjunction with private medical insurance for 
tribal members, might protect the health of the Klamath people in the wake 
of termination.62 Unfortunately, this hope never materialized. In response to 
the Tribal resolution, BIA Portland Area Director Martin Holm told Tribal Chair-
man Seldon Kirk that the Klamath would first need to arrange a complete 
program and operational plan with Dr. Ruth Dunham of the Public Health 
Service (because all matters of Indian health had been transferred from 
the BIA to the PHS in 1955). In addition, the Klamath would be required to 
provide written justification to the BIA for each and every expense paid out 
of the health fund (because the BIA maintained responsibility for decisions 
regarding tribal funds). Thus, even as their time ran out, the Klamath were 
forced to negotiate the bureaucracies of both the PHS and the BIA in their 
attempts to use their own money to address their own health needs. Addition-
ally, the Klamath had difficulty negotiating contracts with pre-paid insurance 
and medical programs, ultimately failing to find an insurance company that 
was willing to cover their specific health needs.63 Even amidst these many 
obstacles, McAnulty and her fellow Executive Committee members worked 
tirelessly to address the situation, which they considered an “emergency” 
requiring “immediate action.”64 Despite their efforts, in August of 1961, the 
Klamath Tribes of Oregon were terminated, leaving members with no medi-
cal plan, no health fund, no insurance, and no medical services.
POST TERMINATION — THE LOSS OF HEALTH
Although supporters had claimed that termination would improve the lives 
of Indians, in reality, it wreaked havoc on the well-being of Klamath Indians, 
with women uniquely affected. In the aftermath of termination, health dispari-
ties between Klamath Indians and the general population intensified even 
as the Klamath lost the slight advantage they had held over other Native 
Americans prior to termination.65 In addition, whereas during the reserva-
tion period women could negotiate western medical practices, integrating 
cultural traditions regarding pregnancy and childbirth as desired, the loss 
of the reservation community brought about by termination appears to have 
intensified the loss of connections to those traditional practices. The overall 
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decline in health for the entire Klamath community also impacted women’s 
overall well-being, which in turn affected their experiences of birth. Thus 
the story of tribal health as a whole is an integral component of the history 
of Klamath childbirth.
As early as 1963, government officials began admitting that termination 
had been an unjust, even immoral, course of action.66 A memo from Secretary 
of Interior Stewart L. Udall to Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs Philleo 
Nash stated that a study of the effects of termination will soon need to be 
done. “My guess,” he wrote, “is that the outcome, in terms of the human 
beings involved, will be a tragic story.”67 In 1965, the BIA conducted such a 
study on Klamath Indians, and indeed the results showed that termination 
had played a prominent role in the tragically rapid decline of the Klamath.68
Perhaps the most obvious and visible effect on Klamath health was 
the lost access to free medical care. This meant two things: first, many 
Klamath were forced to use their lump sum termination payment to cover 
medical expenses; and second, many others, having lost their medical 
clinic, became reluctant to seek needed medical treatment at integrated 
medical centers because of fears regarding money.69 In the first case, 83 
percent of Klamath Indians surveyed by the BIA in 1965 (only four years after 
receiving their money) reported having had medical or hospital expenses, 
and 71 percent reported that they paid medical bills from their personal 
funds. Perhaps even more telling was the fact that only 20 percent of 
Klamath Indians had access to health insurance in 1965, and of this group, 
the vast majority had health insurance that would pay only partial health 
expenses.70 The authors of the 1966 BIA report on the effects of termination 
on the Klamath seemed startled by this lack of health insurance cover-
age for terminated Indians. In its conclusion, the report noted: “In future 
programs of termination of Federal services to Indians, a plan to provide 
voluntary group health insurance would be a desirable consideration.”71 
This suggestion seems both maddening and painfully cruel in light of 
McAnulty and the Executive Committee’s earlier attempts to provide such 
a plan. Thirty years after termination, the Klamath Tribes commissioned a 
study and assessment of their health care needs, which discovered that 
37 percent of Klamath Indians age forty-five and older “felt they needed 
medical care or treatment beyond what they were receiving.”72 The loss of 
the medical clinic combined with a lack of health insurance and fear of high 
medical costs kept many Klamath Indians from seeking medical attention 
even when they knew it was necessary.73
In part because of this lack of access to medical care, Klamath Indi-
ans perceived a decline in their health as a direct result of termination. 
Responding to an American Indian Policy Review Commission’s Task Force 
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Study assessing the effects of termination, Klamath Indians overwhelmingly 
believed that it had caused a dramatic decline in their health. In judging the 
effects of termination on their health and health care, 88 percent of Klamath 
respondents said that termination had had a bad effect; even more striking, 
not one Klamath Indian believed that termination had had a good effect, 
and the remaining 12 percent responded that it either had no effect or they 
did not know.74
Post-termination health statistics bear out this perception of ruined 
health.75 In 1965, the BIA study reported that the Klamath mortality rate 
since termination was 14 persons per 1,000 as compared to the U.S. general 
population mortality rate of 9.4 per 1,000.76 This was a striking finding, as it 
revealed a significantly higher mortality rate for the Klamath despite federal 
assurances that termination would solve this type of disparity. Klamath health 
continued to decline into the 1970s and 1980s. A 1985 health needs and 
assessment study commissioned by the Klamath Tribes and co-conducted by 
Klamath member Shirley Ewart found that 35 percent of Klamath members 
surveyed had diabetes, and 30 percent had arthritis, rheumatism, hyperten-
sion, or gallbladder problems.77 Compounding the negative impact of this 
high rate of illness, Klamath members less frequently reported that they 
were receiving appropriate medical care to treat or manage these serious 
diseases.78 In addition, the Klamath survey included respondents who were 
significantly younger than those in the general population comparison group 
(the Klamath were forty years and older, while the two comparison groups 
included non-Indians sixty-five years and older as well as a second group 
of non-terminated Indians in two age categories: forty years and older and 
sixty years and older), and yet their health was significantly worse than the 
general population and no better than the non-terminated Indian population. 
In some aspects, the Klamath even fared worse than the latter group; the 
authors concluded that among the Klamath “health insurance coverage is 
lower and perceived needs for medical care are higher than among other 
Indians.”79 Clearly, thirty years later, termination had done nothing to help 
the Klamath. Quite to the contrary, it appears to have accelerated the tragic 
losses associated with a century of federal Indian policies.80
An additional traumatic health problem affected the Klamath, quickly dev-
astating many families in the post-termination era. Alcoholism and alcoholism-
related deaths dramatically increased in the years following termination. 
Far-reaching and encompassing both mental and physical health, alcoholism 
touched 80 percent of Klamath families.81 The 1965 BIA study reported that 
in the four and half years since termination, “two-thirds of the deaths in our 
sample were from alcoholism or violent causes.”82 In the post-termination era, 
alcoholism and violence ravaged Indian families.83 As one Klamath woman 
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described the results of termi-
nation: “Drink and death — the 
cemetery’s half full of people 
dead from alcohol . . . a lot of 
heartbreak.”84 Remembering 
a visit to the cemetery with 
Chuck Kimbol (Klamath Tribal 
Chairman in the mid 1970s), 
Soto-Rank recalled the two 
walking amidst the numerous 
graves of Kimbol’s contem-
poraries — men and women 
in their early fifties. The visual 
image of the graves — of so 
many lost Klamath lives — had 
a lasting impact on Soto-Rank. 
An older brother reiterated 
the horrible reality to her, 
“he said you know, there just 
aren’t that many of us that 
survived that.” For Soto-Rank 
and other Klamath members, 
it was a painful legacy. “It was 
an absolute tragedy.”85 The 
Klamath scholar Tom Ball has 
argued that termination, like 
federal policies that came 
before it, resulted in Post-
Colonial Stress Disorder, with 
overwhelming numbers of 
Klamath members experienc-
ing multiple lifetime traumas 
including violent attacks, sexual assaults, and/or deaths of friends or family 
members due to homicide, suicide, and accidents. Likening this trauma to 
war, Ball concludes: “The historical context of the unique trauma history of 
this Tribal sample certainly fits the profile of other survivors of massive war 
trauma.”86 Termination devastated the Klamath. 
Although the decline in tribal health as a whole shaped Klamath women’s 
lives, they were particularly affected by alcoholism and violence in the post-
termination era. In many cases, women bore the brunt of the alcoholism and 
alcohol-related problems. Domestic violence increased dramatically. And 
RAMONA SOTO-RANK was born on the Klamath 
reservation in 1944. She was elected the secretary to 
the General Council of the Klamath Tribes and actively 
participated in the Klamath restoration committee in the 
1980s. In 2000, Soto-Rank became the second American 
Indian woman to be ordained as a Lutheran pastor. She 
served as the associate pastor of Augustana Lutheran 
Church in Portland, Oregon, as well as the president 
of the American Indian and Alaska Native Lutheran 
Association until her death in 2007. 
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although this violence was pervasive, it was neither generally nor openly 
discussed as such, leaving many women to suffer alone.87 In 1994 and 1995, 
the Rural Oregon Minority Prenatal Project (ROMPP) conducted research 
among Klamath and Warm Springs Indian women in an effort to explore the 
connection between “traditional” beliefs and practices regarding pregnancy 
and childbirth and modern use of prenatal care.88 ROMPP researchers noted 
that it took over two years before tribal health workers (Klamath members 
hired by the project to conduct interviews and surveys) were willing to even 
ask about domestic violence; it was such a persistent aspect of women’s 
lives that initially the answer seemed self-evident. In addition to domestic 
and partner violence, Klamath women suffered from other forms of traumatic 
violence on a regular basis, including accidents, gunshot wounds, and other 
incidents.89 Termination created an unsafe environment for Klamath women.
Additionally, termination affected women’s health by interrupting the 
transmission of Klamath cultural traditions regarding prenatal care and 
childbirth. ROMPP researchers, who had conducted focus groups with both 
young women of childbearing age and women considered elders among 
each tribal group in the state, concluded that the federal policy of termina-
tion had had a devastating effect on the “cultural continuity” of pregnancy 
and childbirth practices among Klamath women.90 Whereas Warm Springs 
women described in rich detail pregnancy and childbirth customs passed 
down from mothers and grandmothers, the Klamath women fell silent.91 
Only at the second Klamath focus group did a handful of women speak 
about their traditional customs.92 The lack of Klamath cultural memory was 
not for lack of existence of these traditions. During the pre-reservation era, 
Klamath women followed rich customs regarding pregnancy and childbirth, 
particularly on the birth of the first child. Women received prenatal care and 
advice from their mothers and grandmothers. Midwives assisted during labor 
and birth, tying the baby’s umbilical cord with the mother’s hair. Wrapped in 
blankets, the new mother was seated upon warm stones, remaining there 
for the first five days after the birth.93 Modern Klamath women participating 
in ROMPP, however, had all but lost this legacy of care. 
While termination was certainly not the only federal policy responsible 
for this disruption in women’s cultural knowledge, it undoubtedly exacer-
bated the loss, making it nearly complete.94 As one Klamath elder who had 
worked as a children’s advocate put it: 
Families were breaking up and people were going their own ways. Some chil-
dren had lived in ten different foster homes since Termination when I got there. 
They’ve grown up in a different environment. We have lost what we had.95
Klamath elders were concerned about the effects of this loss of cultural 
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knowledge on the health of pregnant women and their babies. And they 
had reason to be concerned; data collected from 1966 to 1980 showed the 
infant mortality rate for Klamath babies to be 2.5 times that of the state of 
Oregon.96 More than ten years later, the authors of the ROMPP study con-
cluded that termination — a federal policy of assimilation — had interrupted 
the transmission of cultural beliefs and customs regarding pregnancy and 
childbirth. “Current use of prenatal care,” they claimed, “was affected by this 
breakdown as a result of the cultural inappropriateness of the Western model 
of prenatal care, substance abuse, and domestic violence.”97 Additionally, 
the authors noted that the “premature death of elders” also contributed to 
the loss of cultural knowledge; thus, once again, the overall lack of health 
and wellness shaped women’s experiences of pregnancy and childbirth. 
In addition to interrupting women’s cultural knowledge, termination 
devastated the psychological and spiritual health of many Klamath Indi-
ans, which ultimately affected many women’s sense of well-being. In the 
post-termination era, Klamath women experienced loss of tribal identity, 
rejection by many Native American groups, and intense racism from the 
local white communities. All of these things worked together to shape the 
context of Klamath women’s lives. Loss of Indian identity and land left many 
Klamath feeling isolated. In their own history of termination, the Klamath 
Tribes described these “intangible” impacts, stating, “termination took even 
more important assets from the Klamath people  .  .  . the intangible was 
the Klamaths’ identity as an Indian nation. . . . The loss of this identity did 
incalculable psychological damage to the Klamath people.” As Soto-Rank 
recalled, termination “literally ripped the tribe apart.”98 The closure of the 
Klamath roll in 1954 also created new divisions; children born after that 
time were not added to the official roll registering Klamath Indians. Lacking 
a tribal identity, these Klamath children, called simply “descendants,” were 
not officially considered Klamath Indians, despite their Indian heritage.99 For 
withdrawing, remaining, and descendent members of the Klamath Tribes, 
the loss of Indian identity painfully shaped the new reality of their lives. As 
Klamath activist Faith Wright Mayhew, who was six years old at the time 
of termination, commented: “It’s hard to describe what it’s like for children 
who are not allowed to consider themselves an Indian.” Klamath member 
Kathleen Shaye Hill eloquently wrote: “If termination was designed to tear 
apart Klamath families, dissipate the culture, or undermine the well-being 
and pride of a people, it has been a rousing success. If, on the other hand, 
it was actually meant to ‘help’ the Klamath, it can be counted as a dismal 
failed experiment.”100
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RESTORATION
Klamath women created an important impetus for restoration, providing a 
sense of mission along the way.101 Perhaps because in many cases Klamath 
women bore the brunt of the effects of alcoholism and its violence, they 
felt motivated to find solutions to the problems facing their communities. In 
an interview in the 1990s, one Klamath Indian woman, a “descendent” born 
after termination, described her memory of how the process of restoration 
began with concerned Klamath women:
A small group of women met in a home in Chiloquin in the late 1970s, and were 
discussing their disappointment with our people.  .  .  . In this meeting they all 
agreed that if the tribe could be restored officially that maybe as a tribe they 
could work together to improve these situations.102
Tribal restoration became central to solving all the other health needs 
(physical as well as psychological and spiritual) of the Klamath. The root 
causes of their losses were located in federal Indian policies that shaped 
their lives as Klamath women. Soto-Rank, elected Secretary for the General 
Council in 1976, recalled: “We knew our goal had to be restoration.”103 Official 
restoration of their American Indian status would bring immediate access to 
much-needed health services for Klamath Indians, not to mention education 
and economic development. For the Klamath, however, it would do much 
more than this — it would also provide a link to the past and a path to their 
future. Members of the newly re-formed Tribal Council wanted their heritage 
returned to them. Viewing tribal health holistically, they claimed that resto-
ration of tribal status would restore not only important federal services but 
also their psychological well-being.104
Although their activism was not necessarily shaped by a gendered con-
sciousness, women such as Soto-Rank drew inspiration for their work from 
other Native women, thus creating, even if subconsciously, a community of 
American Indian women activists. Native women from many different tribes 
played prominent roles in the American Indian activism of the 1970s, and 
not surprisingly, many knew one another, or at least knew of each other.105 
For Soto-Rank, Native women’s involvement in restoration activities proved 
particularly significant. Ada Deer’s pioneering leadership in restoring the 
Menominee tribe set a powerful example of what was possible.106 Kathryn 
Harrison’s (Grand Ronde) work to restore her Oregon tribe, as well as Lucy 
Covington’s (Colville) efforts to stop termination also became important 
models of Pacific Northwest tribal activism. 
With these and other models of tribal activism, women became active 
members of the Klamath Restoration Committee, performed research vital 
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to the restoration process, and testified before Congress, even as they 
also helped to hold the tribe together.107 Although termination had uniquely 
affected the Klamath, the roots of this federal policy of assimilation and its 
frightening implications resonated with the larger American Indian commu-
nity.108 Linked by a similar history of settler colonialism, the Klamath made 
their struggle a pan-Indian one and, in so doing, solidified not only their tribal 
identity but a larger American Indian identity as well.109 As Klamath women 
forged relationships with Native women pan-tribally, they strengthened their 
own ethnic identity in the process.110
With unanimous approval in both the Senate and House, the Klamath 
Restoration Act finally became law on August 27, 1986, setting off a wave of 
celebrations among the Klamath Indians. In response, Klamath activist Faith 
Wright Mayhew noted that now, “we can at least be recognized as Indians.”111 
Tribal Chairman Chuck Kimbol stated: “Now we have a chance to grow 
again, to become the Indians we all knew we were all along.”112 Restoration 
of the Klamath, brought about by years of grassroots organizing, began the 
process of psychological healing for Klamath Indians as they regained their 
identities, while immediately providing federal funding for essential services 
such as health, education, and economic development.113
As the celebrations quieted, however, it became clear that restoration 
was only the first step; the Klamath Tribal Council quickly began work on 
restoring tribal health. In 1986, at the time of restoration, 60 percent of 
Klamath Indians lived at or below the national poverty line while 46 percent 
were unemployed; this, for a tribe that had once used its own tribal assets 
to offset the costs of its BIA-provided services.114 As a first order of business, 
the Klamath Tribal Council began work on an Economic Self-Sufficiency Plan, 
which focused on the centrality of health to their success as a people.115 In 
a move away from termination, but also away from the BIA-controlled pre-
termination era, Klamath Indians began the process of taking control of their 
health and health care, including the funding for it. 
Although the damage wrought by termination would be neither easily 
nor quickly overcome, the recognition brought about by restoration allowed 
the Klamath to begin to address the dire health needs of their community, 
including those specific to women. Perhaps most important, restoration 
meant that Klamath Indians were immediately eligible for Indian Health Ser-
vices, thus restoring access, a key element to any program of health care. 
Restoration provided immediate entrée for Klamath Indians into existing 
health care programs, even as it inspired the creation of new ones. Although 
many Klamath still lived in the towns of Chiloquin and Klamath Falls, towns 
neighboring the old reservation, many others had moved to urban areas such 
as Portland. Health programs cropped up in both rural and urban areas for 
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assisting Klamath health needs. ROMPP resulted in the creation of a men-
tor program for pregnant Klamath women living near the old reservation. 
Through the discussion of the focus groups, both young women and elder 
women decided that re-establishing a connection between the generations 
would help in the attempt to revive women’s cultural knowledge and ulti-
mately improve pregnancy and childbirth outcomes.116
Despite these positive changes, decades of ruinous federal policies 
could not and cannot be undone by a single legislative act. The Restora-
tion Act of 1986 was merely the beginning of the path to health and heal-
ing for the Klamath. As a group, American Indians continue to experience 
tragic disparities in health as well as access to health care, especially with 
regard to maternal and infant health. According to a 2007 Amnesty Inter-
national Report, 41 percent of American Indian and Alaska Native women 
do not receive “adequate prenatal care.”117 Medical studies consistently 
ON OFFICIAL PASSAGE OF THE RESTORATION ACT, the Klamath celebrated. The tribe 
continues regular restoration celebrations. Here a women’s line is featured. 
Courtesy of Klamath Tribes News Dept. – Taylor R. Tupper: Klamath Tribes Restoration Celebration, Chilquin, Oregon
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demonstrate the importance of prenatal care as a determining factor in 
lowering infant mortality rates.118 Native American women continue to have 
a disproportionately high infant mortality rate, a blatant and preventable 
injustice that leads one to wonder, as did the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights in 2003, why “less value is placed on Indian health than that of 
other populations.”119
Even as the Klamath Tribes continued their struggle for total restora-
tion at the end of the twentieth century, with efforts to have 690,000 acres 
of their former reservation lands returned to the Tribes, the Klamath also 
continued to face a series of challenges in recovering sovereignty in health, 
health care, and the practice and experience of birth. In 1999, noting the 
importance of the land to their overall cultural healing, the Klamath Tribal 
plan for economic self-sufficiency stated: “The culmination of ‘restoration’ in 
its full sense is the healing of the land, its related resources, and the people, 
both Indian and non-Indian.”120 Perhaps one day when this full restoration 
is achieved, Klamath women will be free to determine their experiences of 
birth on their own terms with the resources and funding necessary to do so. 
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3. For an excellent recent history of Ameri-
can Indian women and reproductive history, 
see Barbara Gurr, Reproductive Justice: The 
Politics of Health Care for Native American 
Women (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univer-
sity Press, 2015).
4. Ibid.
5. Lorenzo Veracini and Edward Cava-
nagh, “Settler Colonialism: Definition,” https://
settlercolonialstudies.org/about-this-blog/ 
(accessed March 20, 2016).
6. U.S. American Indian Policy Review 
Commission, Task Force Six, Report on Indian 
Health: Final Report to the American Indian 
Policy Review Commission (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 39.
7. Theodore Stern, The Klamath Tribe: A 
People and Their Reservation (Seattle: Uni-
versity of Washington Press, 1965), 53, 66–67; 
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Leslie Spier, Klamath Ethnography (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1930), 30–31. 
Spier also claims that women participated in 
war parties, but cautions that this information 
was contested. Completed in 1925–1926, 
Spier’s work was based on the memories of 
Klamath elders and middle-aged Klamath 
members at the time. 
8. Spier, Klamath Ethnography, 43. Spier 
also points out the fluidity of gender roles in 
traditional Klamath society, noting that nine 
Klamath members lived as the opposite sex 
at the time of his study.
9. Ibid., 48.
10. Clifford E. Trafzer, “Infant Mortality on 
the Yakama Indian Reservation,” in Clifford 
E. Trafzer and Diane Weiner, eds., Medicine 
Ways: Disease, Health, and Survival Among 
Native Americans (Walnut Creek, Cal.: Al-
tamira Press, 2001), 76.
11. Klamath Tribes of Oregon, Termina-
tion: A Tribe’s Perspective (Klamath Falls, 
Ore., copyright 1999–2001); Robyn A. Rowe, 
Communicating Culture: The Termination 
and Restoration of the Klamath Tribes (M.A. 
thesis, Southwest Missouri State University, 
2003), 4. Although the federal government 
referred to the Klamath as the “Klamath Tribe 
of Oregon,” the Klamath themselves prefer 
the plural “Klamath Tribes of Oregon,” as a 
historical marker of the fact that they were 
originally three tribes
12. Within the first two years of reservation 
living, two fairly separate groups emerged: 
one at the lower end of the reservation that 
comprised mostly Klamath Indians, while 
the other, which developed at Yainax toward 
the upper end of the reservation, was more 
diverse, including some Paiute and Pitt River 
Indians. Stern, The Klamath Tribe, 66–68; 
Rowe, Communicating Culture, 2003.
13. Stern refers to the reservation period 
as a “reservation culture” in an effort to dis-
tinguish between “traditional” and “modern” 
practices. “Reservation culture” indicates a 
process and tension of adaptation and cultural 
negotiation between “traditional” practices 
and imposition of dominant white norms, 
including medicine and religion.
14. Patrick Haynal, “Termination and 
Tribal Survival: The Klamath Tribes of Oregon,” 
Oregon Historical Quarterly 101:3 (2000): 
270–301. Anthropologist Theodore Stern of-
fered native foods as an example of how the 
Klamath adapted white customs even as they 
continued to maintain their own. Klamath fami-
lies accepted agency-issued beef and flour 
as supplements to rather than replacements 
for their traditional foods. Stern, The Klamath 
Tribe, 53, 66–67. 
15. One Indian agent, Agent Knapp, com-
mented in praising the agency physician, “an 
efficient, patient, and intelligent physician 
can do more than almost any other person 
in rooting out their faith in their own ‘spiritual’ 
medicine, and thus opening the way for the 
white man’s customs, laws, and religions.” 
Agent Knapp quoted in Stern, The Klamath 
Tribe, 112.
16. Klamath Tribes of Oregon, Klamath 
Tribes: Termination of the Tribes (Chiloquin, 
Ore.: Klamath Tribes, copyright 1999–2001), 
accessed at www.klamathtribes.org/Termina-
tionStatement.html October 2004, hardcopy 
in author’s possession; Haynal, “Termination 
and Tribal Survival,” 272–75. 
17. Haynal, “Termination and Tribal Sur-
vival,” 272..
18. L. Grace Holmes, R.N., “Klamath Indian 
Survey,” p. 3, manuscript for Oregon Tubercu-
losis Association, 1921, found in RG 75, Records 
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs [hereafter BIA 
Records], Health 1922, File 100, Numerical 
Correspondence, KIA, National Archives and 
Records Administration, Pacific-Alaska Region, 
Seattle, Washington [hereafter NARA Pacific-
Alaska Region]. 
19. Haynal, “Termination and Tribal Sur-
vival,” 272.
20. Klamath Tribes of Oregon, Klamath 
Tribes: Termination of the Tribes.
21. “Field Matrons,” in Claudia Lorenz, The 
Time of My Life, 26, Klamath County Museum 
Research Papers no. 4, (Klamath Falls, Oregon, 
1969). Lorenz’s memoir records anecdotes 
from her childhood as the daughter of Indian 
Service workers stationed on the Klamath 
reservation in the early twentieth century. For 
a thorough history of field matrons, see Lisa 
Emmerich “To Respect and Love and Seek 
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the Ways of White Women: Field Matrons, the 
Office of Indian Affairs, and Civilization Policy, 
1890–1938” (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland 
College Park, 1987).
22. Lorenz, The Time of My Life, 26.
23. Holmes, “Klamath Indian Survey.” For 
more on the transition from field matron to 
field nurse, see Christin L. Hancock, “Healthy 
Vocations: Field Nursing and the Overtones 
of Public Health,” Journal of Women’s History 
23:3 (Fall 2011): 113–37.
24. The field nurse Bessie K. Houts re-
ported in February 1943 that she made many 
of the sick calls by herself because the doctor 
was seventy-five miles away. “Field Nurse 
Monthly Report 1944–1947,” in BIA Records, file 
722.5, decimal correspondence, KIA, NARA 
Pacific-Alaska Region. 
25. “Field Nurse Monthly Report,” BIA 
Records, file 722.5, decimal correspondence, 
KIA, NARA Pacific-Alaska Region; Hancock, 
“Healthy Vocations.” 
26. L. Grace Holmes R.N., Director of 
Bureau of Surveys, Oregon Tuberculosis As-
sociation, to Walter G. West, Superintendent, 
Klamath Agency, August 29, 1922, in RG 75, 
BIA Records, Health 1922, File 100, Numerical 
Correspondence, KIA, NARA Pacific-Alaska 
Region. 
27. Ibid.; Robert Osborne, Field Executive, 
Oregon Tuberculosis Association, 1920, “Tu-
berculosis Survey of the Umatilla Reservation,” 
in BIA Records, health 1922, file 100, numerical 
correspondence, KIA, NARA Pacific-Alaska 
Region. 
28. Klamath members favored the build-
ing of a tuberculosis sanatorium in Eastern Or-
egon. For a long time, the nearest sanatorium 
was in Carson City, Nevada, which was too far 
from the reservation for most Klamath to feel 
comfortable, and thus they rarely received 
treatment for tuberculosis. See BIA Records, 
health 1924, file 100, numerical correspon-
dence, KIA, NARA Pacific-Alaska Region; and 
Holmes, “Klamath Indian Survey.”
29. “Field Nurse Monthly Report 1944–
1947,” BIA Records, file 722.5, decimal corre-
spondence, KIA, NARA Pacific-Alaska Region.
30. Nancy Reifel, “American Indian Views 
of Public Health Nursing, 1930–1950,” Ameri-
can Indian Research Journal 23:3 (1999): 152; 
Emily K. Abel and Nancy Reifel, “Interactions 
between Public Health Nurses and Clients 
on American Indian Reservations During the 
1930s,” Social History of Medicine 9:1 (April 
1996): 89–108. 
31. Rev. Ramona Soto-Rank, oral history 
interview by author, Portland, Oregon, January 
28, 2005, in possession of author.
32. The hospital facility was transformed 
into a medical clinic. Prior to termination, the 
Klamath Executive Committee conducted 
studies on the feasibility of transforming the 
facility back into a hospital or constructing a 
new one, but despite the Klamath’s willing-
ness to pay with their own funds, the BIA 
resisted, thwarting the rebuilding. See Robert 
B. Taylor, State Fire Marshall, to Supt. A.W. 
Gailbraith, March 22, 1956, Public Health, file 
708, Decimal Correspondence, KIA NARA 
Pacific Alaska Region; and Klamath Execu-
tive Committee Minutes, March 20, 1956, box 
2 folder 15, Klamath Tribal Council Records, 
Box 051, Special Collections and University 
Archives, University of Oregon Libraries, Eu-
gene, Oregon [hereafter University of Oregon 
Special Collections. 
33. The Klamath medical clinic ended its 
services to Klamath Indians on June 30, 1960. 
Office memo from Dr. Ruth Dunham, Area 
Medical Officer, Division of Indian Health, 
Public Health Services, to Dr. Wilder, Klamath 
Indian Agency, March 13, 1958; Nurses-Hos-
pital and Public Health, 1955–1957, file 706, 
Decimal Correspondence, KIA, NARA Pacific 
Alaska Region
34. Marriage and Divorce Records, 
1895–1958, KIA, BIA Records, NARA Pacific 
Alaska Region. 
35. Marilyn Gerber Livingston, Klamath 
Indians in Two Non-Indian Communities: 
Klamath Falls and Eugene-Springfield (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Oregon), 3; Spink-Lorenz, 
The Time of My Life, 17–25.
36. Felix S. Cohen, “The Erosion of Indian 
Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucra-
cy,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 62 (1953): 348–90; 
Donald Fixico, Termination and Relocation: 
Federal Indian Policy, 1945–1960 (Albuquer-
que: University of New Mexico Press, 1986), 
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63–66. 
37. “Readiness,” was ostensibly judged 
according to the tribe’s level of assimila-
tion into the dominant white society. Critics 
of termination policy, however, like former 
Commissioner John Collier argued that the 
government used “readiness” as a mask for 
the exploitation of particularly wealthy tribes. 
38. For the disrespectful and bullying be-
havior, see U.S. Congress, Senate Interior and 
Insular Affairs, Committee on Klamath Indian 
Tribe, Termination of Federal Supervision: 
Hearings Before the Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs and the Subcommittee on 
Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate, 84th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., May 21 and Oct. 18, 1956 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 
119–20.
39. Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 
91–92, 96–97.
40. Ibid., 97 
41. Cohen, “The Erosion of Indian Rights,” 
358.
42. John Collier, “The Menominee of 
Wisconsin and the Klamath of Oregon Cases,” 
(Ranchos de Taos, NM, April 1957), Klamath 
Management Specialists, folder 14, articles 
and clippings, University of Oregon Special 
Collections; Christopher K. Riggs, “The Irony 
of American Indian Health Care: The Pueb-
los, the Five Tribes, and Self-Determination, 
1954–1968,” American Indian Culture and 
Research Journal 23:4 (1999): 2. 
43. “Klamaths Withdrawing From Tribe To 
Get Money From Timber in 1960,” Oregonian 
September 16, 1958, p. 7. Those Klamath Indi-
ans who refused to vote as either withdrawing 
or remaining were placed in the remaining 
group. Tom Ball, Ph.D., conversation with 
author, February 19, 2005.
44. Withdrawing members had previously 
received $2,155 each, bringing total shares to 
$45,288. See Klamath Termination Program in 
Oregon, June 1, 1961, “Study on Termination 
of Federal Supervision on Indian Reserva-
tions,” Governors’ Interstate Indian Council 
Committee on Termination, August 1961, p. 
26; Telegraph from David P. Weston to Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs, 10-25-65, “Klamath 
Survey 1965- Correspondence 1969,” PAO Box 
162, BIA Records, NARA Pacific Alaska region; 
Haynal, 278–79. 
45. The contemporary news media 
focused most of its termination coverage 
on the timber question, with little regard for 
other impacts. Much of the historical literature 
on Klamath termination follows this lead, 
exploring the history of the timber dispute 
in the preparation for termination. Because 
this aspect of Klamath termination has al-
ready been well-documented, it will not be 
explored in detail here. Suffice it to say that 
most scholars agree that the government’s 
termination preparations were overwhelm-
ingly preoccupied with how the vast Klamath 
forest land would be sold and managed, with 
considerably less attention given to the hu-
man costs of termination. Additionally, most 
agree that the meager $43,000 that withdraw-
ing members received for their land was in 
itself a tragedy. In fact, although those who 
chose to remain in the tribe generally did not 
do so for monetary reasons, the remaining 
members ended up financially better off, as 
they continued to earn their annual payment 
through 1969, at which time, displeased with 
the U.S. National Bank’s management of their 
trust, the remaining members liquidated their 
assets for just under $60,000 per person. See 
Susan Hood, “Termination of the Klamath In-
dian Tribe of Oregon” Ethnohistory 19:4 (1972): 
379–392; Haynal “Termination and Tribal Sur-
vival”; “Search for Klamath Solution,” Oregon 
Journal, October 8, 1957, p. 4; “Catastrophic 
is the Word,” Oregon Journal, April 19, 1958, p. 
8; “Nothing Easy about Termination,” Oregon 
Journal, September 21, 1958, p. 28; “Klamath 
Withdrawing From Tribe To Get Money From 
Timber in 1960,” Oregonian, September 16, 
1958, p. 7.
46. The Stanford Research Institute’s 
surveys among the Klamath confirmed that 
although the majority of Klamath members 
voted to withdraw from the tribe, they did not 
favor termination. Rather, the vote to withdraw 
was seen by most as the only possible way 
out of an impossible situation. Questionnaire 
responses indicated that most Klamath Indians 
felt antagonistic toward the BIA, which they 
believed had mismanaged their affairs, but 
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that antagonism did not translate into a desire 
for termination. Most expressed that they 
believed termination was a done deal, and as 
such, they wanted to get the most out of it that 
they could. See Stanford Research Institute’s 
Questionnaires, Social Data Compiled to 
Assess Impact of Termination 1947–1957 file, 
KIA, BIA Records, NARA Pacific Alaska Region 
(Seattle). For more on the managers, see Mat-
thew Villeneuve, “ ‘The job was big and the 
man doing it was still bigger’: The Forgotten 
Role of Thomas B. Watters in Klamath Termina-
tion, 1953–1958,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 
116:1 (2015): 40.
47. As one respondent explained, “I have 
my doubts that the people in command will 
see to it that the tribe makes full benefit from 
this. . . . They plan to get the profits, and take 
everything away from the Indians, as they 
always have.” See Stanford Research Insti-
tute’s Questionnaires, Social Data Compiled 
to Assess Impact of Termination 1947–1957 file, 
KIA, BIA Records, NARA Pacific Alaska Region.
48. Preliminary Planning for Termination 
of Federal Control Over the Klamath Indian 
Tribe, Stanford Research Institute, Prepared 
for T.B. Watters, W.L. Phillips, and E.G. Favel, 
Management Specialists, Klamath Falls, Or-
egon, April 1956, 28.
49. Stanford Research Institute’s Ques-
tionnaires, Social Data Compiled to Assess 
Impact of Termination 1947–1957 file, KIA, BIA 
Records, NARA Pacific Alaska Region.
50. Fixico, Termination and Relocation.
51. Evaluation Report: The Indian Health 
Services Implementation of the Indian Self-
Determination Process, prepared by National 
Indian Health Board and American Indian 
Technological Services, April 1984. This report 
argues “only through a concerted national 
tribal effort was the termination policy re-
versed. . . .” Tribes consistently fought against 
termination as a federal policy. Frederick J. 
Stefon, “The Irony of Termination: 1943–58,” 
The Indian Historian 11:3 (1978): 3–14. 
52. One hundred fifty-seven Klamath 
men enrolled in the military during World 
War II. By contrast, only two Klamath women 
enrolled. See U.S. Department of the Interior 
Report, April 30, 1947, Indians in U.S. Army 
1942–1947, file 620, KIA, BIA Records, NARA 
Pacific Alaska Region.
53. “From the Superintendent’s Office,” 
Klamath Reservation News (October 20, 
1953), p. 1, Klamath Tribal Council Records, 
Box 7, folder 10, University of Oregon Special 
Collections. 
54. Even as BIA officials and legislators 
explained termination as “liberating,” they typi-
cally failed to mention the losses that would 
accompany it. A 1976 report on termination 
found that 88 percent of Klamath Indians had 
not known that termination would end their 
services, including health care and education. 
Additionally, 86 percent of Klamath Indians 
surveyed had not understood that termination 
would end their special legal status. “Report 
on Terminated and Non-federally Recognized 
Indians: Final Report to the American Indian 
Policy Review Commission,” Task Force Ten: 
Termination and Non-federally Recognized 
Indians,” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1976), 36–37.
55. Soto-Rank oral history interview.
56. Executive Committee Minutes, Oc-
tober 29, 1956, Portland Oregon meeting, 
Klamath Tribal Council Records, Box 051, 
University of Oregon Special Collections. 
57. Testimony of Dorothea McAnulty, 
Termination of Federal Supervision, U.S. 
Congress, Senate Interior and Insular Affairs, 
Committee on Klamath Indian Tribe, Termina-
tion of Federal Supervision: Hearings before 
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs 
and the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, 
U.S. Senate, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 21 
and October 18, 1956 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1957), 139–43, 
quote from 143.
58. Ibid.,141–42. 
59. Testimony of Mrs. Mary Reys, Termina-
tion of Federal Supervision, U.S. Congress, 
Senate Interior and Insular Affairs, Committee 
on Klamath Indian Tribe, Termination of Fed-
eral Supervision: Hearings before the Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs and the 
Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate, 
84th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 21 and October 
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18, 1956, 160.
60. Executive Committee Minutes, April 
16–17, 1956, Klamath Tribal Council Records, 
Box 051, University of Oregon Special Col-
lections.
61. See Letter from Klamath Valley Hospi-
tal to Dorothea McAnulty, recorded in Execu-
tive Committee Minutes, May 3, 1956, Klamath 
Tribal Council Records, Box 051, University of 
Oregon Special Collections
62. Report re: Health, Medical, Hospital, 
and Ambulance Problems of the Klamath Tribe, 
Executive Committee Minutes, December 4, 
1956, Klamath Tribal Council Records, Box 
051, University of Oregon Special Collections.
63. See Martin N.B. Holm to Mr. S.E. Kirk, 
February 20, 1957, Proposed Klamath Tribal 
Health Plan, 1956–1957, file 725, KIA; BIA Re-
cords, NARA Pacific Alaska Region. 
64. Proposed Klamath Tribal Health Plan, 
1956–1957, file 725, KIA, BIA Records, NARA 
Pacific Alaska Region.
65. Holmes’s 1921 health report showed 
the Klamath to be in slightly better health 
than Warm Springs Indians. These advantages 
were lost in the aftermath of termination. 
66. Thomas Cowger, “ ‘The Crossroads 
of Destiny:’ The NCAI’s Landmark Struggle to 
Thwart Coercive Termination,” American In-
dian Culture and Research Journal 20:4 (1996). 
In 1970 President Nixon formally condemned 
termination, but it was not officially repealed 
until 1988, with efforts led by Senator Daniel 
Inouye. See Sarah Eppler Janda, The Intersec-
tion of Feminism and Indianness in the Activ-
ism of LaDonna Harris and Wilma Mankiller 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 2002).
67. Memorandum from Stewart L. Udall 
to Assistant Secretary Carver Philleo Nash, 
BIA, March 18, 1963, Assistant Area Directors, 
Klamath Termination, Portland Area Office Box 
74, BIA Records, NARA Pacific Alaska Region. 
68. The BIA study noted an improvement 
in housing conditions among Klamath Indians, 
but this was because many Klamath had used 
their per capita money to make sorely needed 
improvements and updates on their homes. In 
some cases, this meant installing a bathroom 
for the first time. Clearly these improvements 
should have been made much earlier at the 
expense of the federal government, not at the 
expense of Klamath ancestral lands. See U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, “Report on the Effects of Withdrawal 
of Federal Supervision of the Klamath Indian 
Tribe,” February 1966, 34, box 18, Philleo Nash 
Papers, National Anthropological Archives, 
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.
69. Although local media referred to the 
Klamath termination payment as a “windfall,” 
the meager $40,000 paid to each Klamath 
member was quickly used up in paying for 
the basic services that had been eliminated 
by termination. See “Study Project at UO to 
Find Out How Klamath Tribe Used Funds,” 
Oregonian, January 17, 1970), p. 15; Kurt 
Austermann, “Irate Indian Deplores Invasion 
of Privacy,” Oregonian January, 1970, p. 15; 
and “Report on the Effects of Withdrawal of 
Federal Supervision,” 1966.
70. “Report on the Effects of Withdrawal 
of Federal Supervision,” 1966, 34, 23. 
71. Ibid., 34.
72. Sandra K. Joos and Shirley Ewart, “A 
Health Survey of Klamath Indian Elders 30 
Years After the Loss of Tribal Status,” Public 
Health Reports 103:2 (March–April 1988): 170.
73. Joos and Ewart, “A Health Survey 
of Klamath Indian Elders,” 170; Rev. Ramona 
Soto-Rank recalled the effects of this loss of 
health care, which caused people to want to 
“give up.” Soto-Rank oral history interview.
74. “Report on Terminated and Non-
federally Recognized Indians,” 1976, 37. 
75. Termination negatively impacted the 
health of other terminated Native Americans 
as well. See Mike Mackey, “Closing the Fort 
Washakie Hospital: A Case Study in Federal 
Termination Policy,” Wyoming History Journal 
67:2 (1995) 36–42; and Kenneth R. Philp, Indian 
Self-Rule: First-Hand Accounts of Indian-White 
Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan (Salt Lake 
City: Howe Brothers, 1986), 141, 233–241.
76. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs, “Report on the Effects 
of Withdrawal of Federal Supervision of the 
Klamath Indian Tribe,” 2.
77. Joos and Ewart, “A Health Survey of 
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Klamath Indian Elders, 166–173.
78. Ibid., 170.
79. Ibid., 173.
80. The Klamath scholar Tom Ball makes 
this argument regarding his study of PTSD 
among adult Klamath members. Ball, conver-
sation with author, February 19, 2005. See also 
Thomas J. Ball, “Prevalence Rate of full and 
partial PTSD and lifetime trauma in a sample 
of adult members of an American Indian tribe,” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Oregon, 1998).
81. “K-Falls worries, but does little about 
its boiling Indian problem,” Oregonian, Janu-
ary 17, 1974, p. 19.
82. “Report on the Effects of Withdrawal 
of Federal Supervision of the Klamath Indian 
Tribe,” 1966, 2.
83. “K-Falls worries, but does little about 
its boiling Indian problem” Oregonian, Janu-
ary 17, 1974. 
84. Julie Kosterlitz, “Sold: A Tribe’s Heri-
tage,” Willamette Week, May 19, 1980, p. 1.
85. Soto-Rank oral history interview.
86. Ball, conversation with author, Febru-
ary 19, 2005. Ball, “Prevalence Rate of full and 
partial PTSD and lifetime trauma,” 108.
87. Mary Ann Curry, R.N., DNS, Faculty, 
Oregon Health Sciences University, School 
of Nursing, telephone communication with 
author, February 23, 2005. 
88. “Traditional” here refers to customs, 
beliefs, and practices deriving from the pre-
white contact era of Native American history. 
Claudia Long and Mary Ann Curry, “Living in 
Two Worlds: Native American Women and 
Prenatal Care,” Health Care for Women Inter-
national 19:3 (May/June 1998): 205–216. Tele-
phone communication with one of the authors 
confirmed that the two tribes studied were 
Klamath and Warm Springs. Curry, telephone 
conversation with author, February 23, 2005. 
89. Long and Curry, “Living in Two 
Worlds.” As a group, Native American women 
are 2.5 times more likely to be sexually as-
saulted than other U.S. women. Unlike other 
sexual assaults, which tend to be intra-racial, 
the majority of rapists of Native American 
women are white. In addition, Native Ameri-
can women are also significantly more likely 
to receive additional violent injuries in the 
midst of sexual assault than are other groups 
of women. See Gurr, Reproductive Justice, 
105–109; and Amnesty International, “Maze 
of Injustice: The Failure to Protect Indigenous 
Women from Sexual Violence in the U.S.,” 
2007 Report, 2–6.
90. Long and Curry, “Living in Two 
Worlds,” 205–16; Curry, telephone communi-
cation with author. 
91. Curry, telephone communication with 
author,.
92. Long and Curry, “Living in Two 
Worlds.”
93. Spier, Klamath Ethnography, 55.
94. According to Ball, the trauma caused 
by termination was not an isolated occurrence, 
but rather the cumulative result of a long his-
tory of injustices against the Klamath. Ball, 
conversation with author, February 19, 2005; 
Ball, “Prevalence Rate of full and partial PTSD 
and lifetime trauma.” 
95. Cited in Long and Curry, “Living in 
Two Worlds,” 211.
96. Kathleen Shaye Hill, “The Klamath: 
Restoration?” Indian Truth, Philadelphia: 
Indian Rights Association, no. 265, (October 
1985): 6–8, 19.
97. Long and Curry, “Living in Two Worlds,” 
210, 211.
98. Klamath Tribes, Klamath Tribes: Ter-
mination of the Tribes, (Chiloquin, Oregon: 
Klamath Tribes, 2001), 4; Ball’s study also 
discusses this psychological damage. See 
Ball, “Prevalence Rate of full and partial PTSD 
and lifetime trauma”; and Soto-Rank oral his-
tory interview.
99. By the time of Klamath restoration 
in 1986, more than 1,000 descendents had 
been born — all of them excluded from official 
Klamath recognition. See Dana Tims, “Klam-
aths Rejoice in New Era: Law Will Restore 
Identity,” Oregonian, August 24, 1986, p. A1. 
100. James C. Flanigan, “Klamath Tribe 
Bill Passes,” Oregonian, August 16, 1986, p. 
B1; Hill, “The Klamath,” 7.
101. In the aftermath of termination, 
Klamath women dominated Klamath men in 
numbers in every age category over 18, thus, 
during the period of restoration, the Klamath 
tribe was predominately female. Klamath 
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Tribes of Oregon, “Tribal Health Policies and 
Programs,” Economic Self-Sufficiency Plan, 
(Klamath Falls, Oregon, October 2000), 33.
102. Interview with unnamed Klamath 
Indian women, quoted in Rowe, Communicat-
ing Culture, 28.
103. Rev. Ramona Soto-Rank, conversation 
with author, January 21, 2005, Portland, Ore. 
According to Soto-Rank, Kimboll’s leadership 
was instrumental in pulling people together 
— people who didn’t necessarily agree with 
one another — to move forward. Soto-Rank 
oral history interview.
104. David Whitney, “Restored Tribal Sta-
tus Sought for Klamaths,” Oregonian, October 
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